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CHICAGO v. MORALES
By Darren Welch

The successful challenge to Chicago's six-year old gang loitering ordinance in the Illinois Supreme
Court made unconstitutional a significant tool for fighting local gang problems. The United States
Supreme Court must now decide if this powerful device employed by local police in an attempt to
clean up the streets is in violation of substantive due process.
In 1992, the City of Chicago held hearings on the subject of gangs. The city found that criminal
street gangs in Chicago contributed to an increase in Chicago's crime rate and that law-abiding
residents were intimidated by gangs. The city also found that gangs establish control over areas by
loitering and intimidating those who come near. In response to these findings, the city enacted
Chicago Municipal Code section 8-4-015 (1992), otherwise known as the Gang Congregation
Ordinance. The ordinance states:
Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be a criminal street
gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such
persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area.
Failure to do so is punishable by up to $500, imprisonment up to six months, and up to 120 hours of
community service.
This appeal is the consolidation of three cases involving over seventy defendants contesting the
constitutionality of the statute. In the case before the Illinois Supreme Court, the city appealed the
Cook County Circuit Court's dismissal of charges against one group of defendant's and the Appellate
Court's determination that the ordinance is unconstitutional in the other two cases. In the lower
appellate courts, the defendants successfully argued that 1) The ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad 2) The ordinance was unconstitutionally vague; 3) The ordinance criminalized the status
of being a gang member; and 4) The ordinance improperly permitted officers to avoid the requisite
of finding probable cause in fighting crimes associated with gang members. The Supreme Court of
Illinois affirmed, holding that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and that the ordinance was
an arbitrary restriction on personal liberty in violation of substantive due process. The City of
Chicago petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear the case and the Court granted certiorari
to decide if the ordinance violates substantive due process guarantees.
The Supreme Court has a history of striking vague loitering ordinances and similar statutes. In
Coates v. City of Cincinnati (1971) the Court struck a general anti-loitering ordinance as a violation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville (1972), the Court
found the city's vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally vague. In Kolender v. Lawson (1983), the
Court found unconstitutionally vague a statute requiring loiterers to provide police officers with
reliable identification when the police officer has grounds to justify a stop. In Shuttlesworth v. City
I

ofBirmingham (1965), the Court struck an ordinance criminalizing refusal to follow a police officer's
order to disperse, noting a constitutional right to freedom of movement.
Several local and state government associations and community interest associations filed amicus
briefs in support of the petitioner, the City of Chicago. These groups include the National District
Attorneys Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, U.S. Conference of Mayors,
National Governors' Association, Council of State Governments, International City/County
Management Association, International Municiple Lawyers Association, Attorneys General of 31
States, and the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations. In general, the briefs argue that the ordinance
is rationally related to legitimate government interests, that it is not impermissibly vague, and that the
ordinance is an effective, popular, minimally intrusive tool for fighting serious local gang problems.
The Supreme Court now must decide between the competing interests of effective local crime
prevention and one's civil liberty to congregate in the streets.
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Chicago, Ill. v. Morales

Ruling below (Ill SupCt, 177 Ill.2d 440, 227 IlI.Dec. 130, 687 N.E.2d 53, 66 LW 1304, 62 CrL
1108):
Chicago ordinance providing that 'whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably
believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more persons,
he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area,' and making it
violation to fail to promptly obey such order, fails to give persons of ordinary intelligence reasonable
opportunity to distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct, fails to adequately define offense
so as to avoid encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and, therefore, is
unconstitutionally vague on its face; ordinance unreasonably infringes upon personal liberty of being
able to freely walk streets and associate with others and, therefore, violates substantive due process.
Questions presented: (1) Is loitering ordinance authorizing arrest of persons who have disobeyed
police order to move on, given when police officer has reasonable cause to believe that group of
loiterers contains member of criminal street gang, impermissibly vague in violation of due process
guarantees? (2) Despite legislative findings about deleterious effects of loitering by criminal street
gangs, does ordinance that requires group of loiterers containing criminal street gang members to
obey police order to move on violate substantive due process guarantees?
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THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant
V.

JESUS MORALES et al., Appellees
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS
October 17, 1997, Filed

NICKELS, J.
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined
that the continuing increase in criminal street gang
activity in the City is largely responsible for this
unacceptable situation; and

These consolidated appeals involve 70
defendants who were charged with violating the
City of Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance
(Chicago Municipal Code § 8--4--015 (added
June 17, 1992)).

WHEREAS,
In
many
neighborhoods
throughout the City, the burgeoning presence of
street gang members in public places has
intimidated many law abiding citizens; and

BACKGROUND
In May 1992, the Chicago city council held
hearings to explore the problems criminal street
gangs present for the city's residents. Of particular
concern was the problems gang members cause
by loitering in public. Witnesses testified how
gang members loiter as part of a strategy to claim
territory, recruit new members, and intimidate
rival gangs and ordinary community residents.
Testimony revealed that street gangs are
responsible for a variety of criminal activity,
including drive-by shootings, drug dealing, and
vandalism.

WHEREAS, One of the methods by which
criminal street gangs establish control over
identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and
intimidating others from entering those areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs
avoid arrest by committing no offense punishable
under existing laws when they know the police
are present, while maintaining control over
identifiable areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined
that loitering in public places by criminal street
gang members creates a justifiable fear for the
safety of persons and property in the area because
of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often
associated with such activity; and

As a result of the hearings, the city council
enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, more
commonly known as the "gang loitering
ordinance." The city council incorporated its
findings in the preamble to the ordinance, as
follows:
"WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other
cities across the nation, has been experiencing an
increasing murder rate as well as an increase in
violent and drug related crimes; and
4

WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in
discouraging all persons from loitering in public
places with criminal gang members; and
WIEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to

preserve the city's streets and other public places
so that the public may use such places without
fear[.]" Chicago Municipal Code § 8--4--015
(added June 17, 1992).
"(a) Whenever a police officer observes a
person whom he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any
public place with one or more other persons, he
shall order all such persons to disperse and
remove themselves from the area. Any person
who does not promptly obey such an order is in
violation of this section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an
alleged violation of this section that no person
who was observed loitering was in fact a member
of a criminal street gang.

The gang loitering ordinance
pertinent part:

provides

in

[A]fter the gang loitering ordinance was
enacted, the Chicago police department issued a
general order which provides guidelines for
enforcement of the ordinance. Among other
things, the general order sets forth standards for
identifying criminal street gangs and specifies
criteria for establishing probable cause that an
individual is a member of a criminal street gang.
Upon review, the appellate court held the
ordinance unconstitutional on several grounds.
First, the appellate court found the ordinance
unconstitutionally overbroad because it violates
the first amendment rights of association,
assembly, and expression. In addition, the
appellate court found that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague. Next, the appellate
court determined the ordinance criminalizes a
person's status in violation of the eighth
amendment. Finally, the appellate court
determined the ordinance allows arrests without
probable cause, in violation of the fourth
amendment. Youkhana, 277 Ill. App. 3d 101.

(c) As used in this section:
(1) 'Loiter' means to remain in any one place
with no apparent purpose.
(2) 'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing
organization, association in fact or group of three
or more persons, whether formal or informal,
having as one of its substantial activities the
commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members
individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

The city urges that the judgment of the
appellate court be reversed because the gang
loitering ordinance: (1) sufficiently defines
criminal conduct such that it is not
unconstitutionally vague; (2) is not overbroad
because it is a permissible restriction of first
amendment rights; (3) does not create a status
offense; and (4) requires the police to establish
probable cause of illegal conduct before an
offender can be arrested.

(5) Public place' means the public way and any
other location open to the public, whether
publicly or privately owned." Chicago Municipal
Code § 8--4--015 (added June 17, 1992).
Each violation of the ordinance is punishable by
a fine of up to $500, imprisonment for not more
than six months, and the requirement to perform
up to 120 hours of community service.
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We find that the gang loitering ordinance
violates due process of law in that it is
impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary
restriction on personal liberties. In doing so, we

need not reach the issues that the ordinance
creates a status offense, permits arrests without
probable cause or is overbroad.

doctrine requires a criminal statute to be
sufficiently defined so it provides persons of
ordinary intelligence adequate notice of
proscribed conduct. Due process guarantees this
adequate notice of proscribed conduct so that
ordinary persons are not required to guess at a
law's meaning but, rather, can know what conduct
is forbidden and act accordingly.

ANALYSIS
1. Vagueness

Loitering and vagrancy statutes have been
utilized throughout American history in an
attempt to prevent crime by removing
"undesirable persons" from public before they
have the opportunity to engage in criminal
activity. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 161-63.
Nevertheless, it is well settled that broadly
worded criminal loitering laws which prohibit
loitering without additional unlawful conduct are
doubtlessly
unconstitutional.
See,
e.g.,
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 US. 87
(1965).

A well-established element of the guarantees of
due process is the requirement that the
proscriptions of a criminal statute be clearly
defined. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 269. To
successfully challenge a criminal statute as being
vague on its face, the statute must be
impermissibly vague in all of its applications. That
is, the statute must be shown to be vague "in the
sense that no standard of conduct is specified at
all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
614 (1971). If on its face the challenged statute
violates the due process clause, then the specific
details of the individual offense would not serve
to validate the statute.

The [Chicago] ordinance seeks to criminalize
acts of "loitering" in a public place. Webster's
defines "loiter" to mean "to remain in or near a
place in an idle or apparently idle manner" and to
"hang around aimlessly." The infirmity with this
type of prohibition is that it fails to distinguish
between innocent conduct and conduct calculated
to cause harm and "makes criminal activities
which by modern standards are normally

To satisfy the vagueness doctrine, a criminal
statute must meet two basic criteria. First, a
criminal statute must be sufficiently definite so
that it gives persons of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to distinguish between
lawful and unlawful conduct. Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Second, a
penal statute must adequately define the criminal
offense in such a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; see also
Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 162 (1972). We evaluate the provisions of
the gang loitering ordinance in light of the due
process critena.

innocent" (Papachristou,405 U.S. at 163) * **

Moreover, the definition of "loiter" provided by
the ordinance does not assist in clearly articulating
the proscriptions of the ordinance. The ordinance
defines "loiter" to mean "to remain in any one
place with no apparent purpose." Chicago
Municipal Code § 8--4-- 015(c)(1) (added June
17, 1992). People with entirely legitimate and
lawful purposes will not always be able to make
their purposes apparent to an observing police

A. Adequate Notice
The first criterion of the void-for-vagueness
6

officer. For example, a person waiting to hail a
taxi, resting on a corner during a jog, or stepping
into a doorway to evade a rain shower has a
perfectly legitimate purpose in all these scenarios;
however, that purpose will rarely be apparent to
an observer.

The city contends, in the alternative, that the gang
loitering ordinance's prohibited conduct is made
up of specific elements in addition to mere
loitering.

Courts in several other jurisdictions have found
similarly worded prohibitions of criminal loitering
statutes unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492
F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974) (loitering without
apparent reason), affd sub nom. Lefkowitz v.
Newsome, 420 US. 283, 43 L. Ed. 2d 196, 95 S.
Ct. 886 (19 75); Powell v. Stone, 507 E 2d 93, 95
(9th Cir. 1974) (loitering without apparent
reason), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 465, 49
L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); Ricks v.
District of Columbia, 134 U.S. App. D.C. 201,
414 F.2d 1097, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (loitering
without visible business); Kirkwood v. Loeb, 323
F Supp. 611, 614-15 (WD. Tenn. 1971)
(loitering without any legitimate purpose); In re
C.M, 630 P.2d 593, 596 (Colo. 1981) (loitering
without legitimate reason); People v. Berck, 32
N.Y.2d 567, 300 NE.2d 411, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1973) (loitering without apparent reason).

First, the city argues that the ordinance
prohibits loitering with the additional element of
being with a member of a criminal street gang.* *
* Rather, the ordinance requires only that the
arresting officer have a reasonable belief that one
person in a group of loiterers is a gang member.

1. Loitering With a Criminal Street Gang Member

In addition, the city cites several cases for the
proposition that an ordinance prohibiting loitering
alone is sufficiently defined to pass the void-forvagueness test. However, in all of the cases cited
by the city, the courts upheld ordinances which
criminalized loitering combined with some other

However, a reasonable belief, or probable
cause, is insufficient to support a criminal
conviction. In addition, this added element is itself
vague, as it conveys no precise warning of the
proscribed conduct understandable by an ordinary
person. An individual standing on a street corner
with a group of people has no way of knowing
whether an approaching police officer has a
reasonable belief that the group contains a
member of a criminal street gang. That condition
depends solely on the police officer's subjective
evaluation of the facts of the situation in light of
his own experience.

2. Failure to Obey a Dispersal Order
The city contends that another specific element
of the offense of gang loitering is the failure to
obey a police order to disperse. This is also
insufficient to cure the vagueness of the
ordinance. In Shuttlesworth, the Supreme Court
reviewed a conviction pursuant to an ordinance
which made it "'unlawful for any person to stand

overt act or criminal intent.* * * The city's

argument is without merit.
These cases demonstrate that when the term
"loitering" is joined with a second specific element
to form the prohibited conduct defined by a
criminal loitering statute, courts have uniformly
found that the law sufficiently informs persons as
to the forbidden conduct and, thus, is not vague.

or loiter upon any street or sidewalk ... after

having been requested by any police officer to
move on."' Shuttlesworth, 382 US. at 90-92. The
Court determined that, as written, the ordinance
was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed
7

a person to "stand on a public sidewalk only at
the whim of any police officer." Id.

merit their displeasure."' Papachristou,405 U.S.
at 170.

The proscriptions of the gang loitering
ordinance are essentially the same as the
Shuttlesworth ordinance. Merely adding the
element of refusing to obey an order by police to
disperse does not elevate the gang loitering
ordinance to such a level that it provides adequate
notice of proscribed conduct.* * *
Furthermore, if the underlying statute is itself
impermissibly vague, as the gang loitering
ordinance here, then a conviction based upon
failure to obey the order of a police officer
pursuant to that statute cannot stand. See
Shuttlesworth, 382 US. at 90-92.

The gang loitering ordinance fails to meet these
standards. The ordinance provides such
ambiguous definitions of its elements that it does
not discourage arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement. The definition of loitering as "to
remain in any one place with no apparent
purpose" provides absolute discretion to police
officers to decide what activities constitute
loitering. Moreover, police are given complete
discretion to determine whether any members of
a group are gang members. These guidelines do
not conform with accepted standards for defining
a criminal offense.

For these reasons, we find that the gang
loitering ordinance fails to meet the adequate
notice standards of the vagueness doctrine.
B. Arbitrary Enforcement
The second and more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine is the requirement that a penal
statute must adequately define a criminal offense
in such a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; Haywood, 118 Ill.
2d at 269. Where lawmakers fail to provide
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement, a
criminal law "may permit 'a standardless sweep
[that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections."' Kolender,
461 U.S. at 358.
Moreover, when a law fails to provide
standards regulating the exercise of its discretion,
"the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement of the law. [The
law] furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to

We empathize with the city council's objectives
in enacting the gang loitering ordinance. Criminal
street gangs are an expanding cancer in our
society and their illegal activities endanger the
safety of many law-abiding citizens. Nevertheless,
as important as it is to abate this problem, the city
cannot fight gang crime through the enactment
and enforcement of an ordinance that fails to meet
constitutional standards for definiteness and
clarity. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361.
II. Substantive Due Process
Defendants also contend that the gang loitering
ordinance is an arbitrary exercise of the city's
police power and, thus, violates substantive due
process. The city responds that defendants have
no constitutional right to loiter. We agree with
defendants.
The city is incorrect in its contention that the
gang loitering ordinance intrudes upon no
constitutionally
protected
activity.
In
Papachristou, the Supreme Court reviewed a
statute which prohibited, among other things, the
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suspicion that they may commit some future
crime, are arbitrary and likely to be enforced in a
discriminatory manner. See Papachristou, 405
U.S. at 166.

acts of loafing, loitering, and nightwalking. The
Court observed that, although not expressly
mentioned in the Constitution, such activities are
amenities of American life. Papachristou, 405
U.S. at 164. The freedom to engage in such
harmless activities is an aspect of the personal
liberties protected by the due process clause. See
City of Chicago v. Wilson, 75 111. 2d 525, 529-30
(1978), citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976).

The city is not helpless in its war against the
criminal activity of gangs. Many of the offensive
activities the city claims the gang loitering
ordinance wilt deter are already criminal acts.
See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12--6 (West 1996)
(intimidation); 720 ILCS 5/12--6.1 (West 1996)
(compelling organization membership of persons);
720 ILCS 5/12--6.2 (West 1996) (aggravated
intimidation-a gang member committing the
offense of intimidation for the purpose of
furthering gang activities); 720 ILCS 5/25--l
(West 1996) (mob action). However, the city
cannot empower the police to sweep undesirable
persons from the public streets through vague and
arbitrary criminal ordinances. We hold the that
the gang loitering ordinance is an arbitrary
restriction on personal liberty and, thus, violates
substantive due process. Therefore, we need not
determine whether the gang loitering ordinance
impermissibly infringes on either the first
amendment right of expressive association or the
fundamental right of intimate association, both of
which command a much higher level of scrutiny.

Among those protected personal liberties which
have long been recognized are the general right to
travel, the right of locomotion, the right to
freedom of movement, and the general right to
associate with others. The gang loitering
ordinance impedes upon all of these personal
liberty interests.
We recognize that such personal liberties are
not absolute. Only governmental actions which
intrude upon personal liberties arbitrarily or in an
utterly unreasonable manner violate the due
process clause. Nevertheless, we find that the
gang loitering ordinance unreasonably infringes
upon personal liberty. Persons suspected of being
in criminal street gangs are deprived of the
personal liberty of being able to freely walk the
streets and associate with friends, regardless of
whether they are actually gang members or have
committed any crime. As one trial judge warned
one of defendants below, "[the police] will lock
you up just for being who you are." Such laws,
arbitrarily aimed at persons based merely on the

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the
appellate court are affirmed.
Appellate court judgments affirmed.
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U.S. SUPREME COURT PLEA PITS CITY AGAINST RIGHTS GROUP
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
March 18, 1998
Steve Lash

WASHINGTON -- In a case that pits the city against the American Civil Liberties Union, Chicago
has urged the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of an ordinance that permits the police
to disband groups of people congregating on street corners.
Chicago's controversial six-year-old Gang Congregation Ordinance calls for police to tell loiterers
to disperse if the officer believes a street-gang member is present.
The city says the law is necessary in the fight against gang violence; the ACLU counters that the
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, making it difficult for people to understand what behavior is
prohibited and too easy for police to act arbitrarily and indiscriminately in enforcing the law.
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the rights group on Oct. 17, calling the ordinance unclear
and in violation of the Constitution's right to assembly. The city then appealed to the U.S. high court,
which has yet to decide whether it will hear the case.
In its request for Supreme Court review, Chicago conceded the ordinance interferes with the right
of individuals to congregate peacefully on street corners. Nevertheless, the city added in its brief to the
justices, the law passes constitutional muster because the dispersal of potential gang members is
"rationally related" to the government's "legitimate" interest in discouraging gang activity.
"Here, the gang loitering ordinance infringes the 'liberty' interest in using the public ways only to a
limited extent -- anyone can loiter alone, or even with others, including criminal street-gang members,
as long as they move along when directed to do so," the corporation counsel's office said in the brief
"Here, the City Council reasonably concluded that the need to remove the visibly lawless element of
loiterers from the public ways -- because their loitering itself destabilizes communities, lowers property
values and intimidates law-abiding residents -- justified whatever burden is imposed on persons
engaged in 'innocent' activity who are directed to move along as a result of this ordinance."
The ACLU countered that Chicago was using the wrong test for judging the constitutionality of an
ordinance which tramples on the rights of individuals. The test is not whether the law is rationally
related to a legitimate interest, the rights group asserted in its reply brief, but whether the ordinance
is "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling" interest -- a level of scrutiny the law does not meet.
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"[I]t is not only suspected gang members who will be caught in the snares of the ordinance," the
Chicago chapter of the ACLU wrote in a brief urging the justices to reject the city's appeal. "Persons
in the company of gang members, including family members, and even persons who do not know of
the gang members' status, are subject to arrest and prosecution under the ordinance."
The case on appeal, Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121, arose June 17, 1992, when the city council
-- facing the scourge of street gangs -- passed the controversial ordinance authorizing police to order

people loitering in public to disperse if the officer reasonably believes a gang member is in the group.
People who fail to comply with the officer's request face up to six months in prison, a $500 fine or up
to 120 hours of community service.
Prosecutions under the ordinance led to disparate rulings, with some trial judges holding for the
prosecution and others finding the law unconstitutional. On appeal, in which the cases of Jesus Morales
and about 65 other people arrested under the ordinance were consolidated, the Ist District Appellate
Court ruled for the defendants, saying the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.
The Illinois Supreme Court, upholding the Appellate Court, said the law "unreasonably infringes"
upon the liberty of people standing in public places.
"Persons suspected of being in criminal street gangs are deprived of the personal liberty of being able
to freely walk the streets and associate with friends, regardless of whether they are actually gang
members or have committed any crime," the state high court ruled. "Such laws, arbitrarily aimed at
persons based merely on the suspicion that they may commit some future crime, are arbitrary and likely
to be enforced in a discriminatory manner."
Supporting Chicago in its request for high-court review are neighborhood, municipal and police
groups. No organizations have submitted amicus briefs to the high court in support of the ACLU.
"Only this court's intervention can restore uniformity to this important area of federal constitutional
law, which, perhaps more than any other, touches the day-to-day lives of our citizenry," wrote Chicago
Neighborhood Organizations, an ad hoc group of Chicagoans who work to stop drug abuse, violence
and gang activity in their neighborhoods. "This court should grant certiorari to declare firmly that the
[Constitution's] due process clause does not prevent the people from reclaiming their communities."
The U.S. Conference of Mayors and other governmental groups urged the justices to impose a
compelling-interest test on the ordinance, just as the ACLU did. But unlike the rights group, the
governmental organizations said the law would be found constitutional under that standard.
"Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance is a narrowly tailored response to the very serious problem of
gang intimidation on city streets," the groups wrote in their brief to the high court. "Communities
throughout the country are searching for new and innovative ways to control gang violence and
intimidation. Decisions like this one [from the Illinois Supreme Court] inevitably chill legitimate
experimentation."
11

Joining the U.S Conference of Mayors on the brief were the National League of Cities, National
Association of Counties, International City/County Management Association, International Municipal
Lawyers Association and the International Association of Chiefs of Police.
Copyright (c) 1998 by Law Bulletin PublishingCompany
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COURT TO RULE ON LOITERING LAW AIMED AT GANGES; CHICAGO
OFFICIALS SAY ORDINANCE DETERS PRESENCE; RIGHTS GROUPS CALL IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Washington Post
April 21, 1998
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to hear Chicago's defense of an anti-loitering ordinance aimed
at gang members, who, the city says, "blatantly engage in drug deals" but once police arrive pretend
to be innocently hanging out.
Numerous states and municipal groups urged the high court to take the case in light of increasing
legislation targeting gangs as well as many types of public conduct on the streets. Civil libertarians and
defense lawyers, meanwhile, contend authorities are going too far, curtailing harmless behavior and
violating constitutional rights.
The ordinance adopted by the Chicago City Council in 1992 allows a police officer to order any group
of individuals loitering in a public place to disperse if the officer "reasonably believes" that
someone who belongs to a street gang is in the group. Anyone who fails to leave can be sentenced to
six months in prison, a $500 fine or up to 120 hours of community service. "Loiter" is defined as "to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose."
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled last year that the law was impermissibly vague and violated
constitutional due process of law. The state court said the law failed to give people notice of exactly
what conduct was prohibited and deprived "persons suspected of being in criminal street gangs
of
the personal liberty of being able to freely walk the streets and associate with friends, regardless of
whether they are actually gang members or have committed any crime."
But the city, in its appeal, said "no one who has been given a police order to move on could fail to
understand what is required of him." It noted that the ordinance says no arrest can be made unless there
is first a police order to move on and a refusal by the subject to abide by the officer's order.
Brian L. Crowe, lawyer for the city, told the court that the ordinance was carefully crafted after public
has a palpable detrimental
hearings and a determination that "the intimidating presence of gangs
effect on a family's sense of well-being, on the willingness of parents to allow their children outside and
on the willingness of Chicago residents to remain in the city."
Defense lawyers urged the high court not to take the case or to revive the ordinance.
"The city's rigid enforcement policy," said Harvey Grossman of the American Civil Liberties Union,
13

makes it nearly impossible for potential arrestees to explain why they are waiting at some corner.
Grossman referred to "persons who wish to inform an officer that they are waiting for a taxi, which
may take some time on the south side of Chicago, or for a friend or family member to arrive."
Thirteen states, including Virginia, had urged the high court to take Chicago's appeal, saying that the
Illinois court's decision "overprotects criminal gangs but also underprotects other members of urban
communities." In a similar vein, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National League of Cities and
other municipal groups said Chicago's ordinance was a proper response to the serious problem of gang
intimidation.
The case of Chicago v. Morales will be heard in the term that begins next October, and a ruling is
likely to be handed down sometime in 1999.
Copyright 1998, The Washington Post Co. All Rights Reserved

14

HIGH COURT STUDIES LOITERING LAW: POLICE AROUND NATION HOPING
FOR LEGAL WAY TO CLEAR STREETS
The New Orleans Times-Picayune
April 21, 1998
Linda Greenhouse 1998, The New York Times
The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to decide whether the police can use anti-loitering laws to
keep gang members from congregating and to arrest those who refuse to move on.
The case, an appeal by the city of Chicago, is being closely watched by city and state officials and
law-enforcement agencies across the country. It offers the court perhaps the clearest chance in 25 years
to revisit a precedent that sent once-common anti-loitering laws into eclipse by declaring a Jacksonville,
Fla., vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally vague.
In 1992, Chicago officials enacted an ordinance that made gang members, rather than loiterers or
wanderers at large, the explicit targets. City officials had hoped that such a narrowed focus would
avoid the pitfalls that Justice William Douglas identified in his 1972 opinion, Papachristou vs. City of
Jacksonville.
That opinion, which quoted Henry David Thoreau and Walt Whitman, extolled nonconformists who
lead "lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence" and said they should not
have their freedom inhibited by vague and arbitrary anti-loitering laws.
But while the language of Douglas' Papachristou opinion sounds distinctly anachronistic in light of
the current court's greater deference to law enforcement, Chicago's effort has not succeeded.
The Illinois Supreme Court, citing the Papachristou decision, declared the city's Gang Congregation
Ordinance unconstitutional last October. The ordinance "violates due process of law in that it is
impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties," the state court said.
The Chicago law defines "loiter" as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose." The
ordinance provides that "whenever a police officer observes a person he reasonably believes to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall order
all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area." Anyone who does not obey such
an order faces a criminal conviction with as long as six months imprisonment, a $500 fine, or as many
as 120 hours of community service.
During the three years that the ordinance was in effect, the Chicago police made some 43,000 arrests,
and levels of gang-related violence, including murder, dropped substantially, the city's brief told the
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court. The case before the Illinois Supreme Court was a consolidated appeal involving 70 defendants
who had brought a number of separate challenges.
Chicago's appeal, Chicago vs. Morales, No. 97-1121, stressed the usefulness of the ordinance, as did
briefs filed with the court by 13 states and by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and other
government and law-enforcement organizations. The city said that gang members remained on the
street to protect their turf and intimidate others.
The city said the ordinance was "the antithesis of vague" because a person could be arrested only after
violating a direct police order to move. "People are told precisely what they must do," the brief said.
But the Cook County public defender's office, in urging the court not to hear the city's appeal, said
the problem was that "the ordinance provides no guidance for avoiding a police order to
disperse in the first place." By leaving that question to the discretion of the police, the public defender's
brief said, the ordinance encouraged "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

The New Orleans Times-Picayune Copyright 1998
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PROSECUTORS ARE TURNING TO POWERFUL FEDERAL STATUTES AND SOME
HANDY LOCAL ORDINANCES TO STOP CRIMINAL GANGS IN THEIR TRACKS.
ABA Journal
January, 1998
John Gibeaut

[T]oday's sophisticated gangs no longer evoke the image of cigarette-smoking, hubcap-stealing
hoodlums hanging out on street corners. Gangs aren't kid stuff.
"People assume that gangs mean teen-agers and juveniles," says FBI agent Kenneth E. New, chief of
the bureau's Safe Streets/Gangs Unit, which runs 40 multi-agency gang enforcement task forces
throughout the nation. "But that's just not true. When you have a Black Gangster Disciple Nation, the
leaders are all adults. Hoover's no spring chicken."
As the gangs become more refined, so, too, have law enforcement tools for dealing with them. At the
federal level, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and related conspiracy statutes
have become the preferred weapons for removing gang leaders from the streets.
Originally designed for traditional mobsters and white-collar crooks, RICO is ideally suited for street
gangs, says the 1970 statute's author, Notre Dame University law Professor G. Robert Blakey.
"They're in the process of growing into Mafias," says Blakey, formerly a lawyer for the Justice
Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. "The Mafia started out as a street gang."
In California, which dwarfs the rest of the nation in gang activity, state prosecutors and municipal
attorneys have succeeded in using public nuisance laws to obtain injunctions that prevent targeted gang
members from congregating in public.
"It is my belief that it should be used everywhere," says Michael Genelin, head of the Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Hard-Core Gang Division. "It's the strongest new weapon we have against
gangs."
In Illinois, however, the state supreme court recently dealt gang enforcement efforts a setback when
it declared unconstitutional a Chicago anti-gang loitering ordinance with similar goals. City attorneys
plan to take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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In Los Angeles and other communities, authorities believe they have found the perfect tool for
dealing with gangs that more closely resemble groups of street punks than La Cosa Nostra.
For nearly a decade, they have been dabbling with public nuisance laws to get civil injunctions
forbidding gang members from associating in public and from engaging in other legal activities, such
as carrying pagers and cellular phones, which police say are tools of the drug trade.
The California Supreme Court dealt gangs a blow last year when it rejected a First Amendment
challenge to an injunction barring 38 reputed gang members from hanging out in a four-block area of
San Jose's Rocksprings neighborhood. Calling the area an "urban war zone" and describing its residents
as "prisoners in their own homes," Justice Janice Rogers Brown concluded that something had to give.
"To hold that the liberty of the peaceful, industrious residents of Rocksprings must be forfeited to
preserve the illusion of freedom for those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community as a whole
is to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the whole of its sense," Brown wrote.
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596.
With about a dozen gang injunctions already in place in various areas, officials in Los Angeles
obtained the boldest one yet last summer against 50 members of the 18th Street Gang in the largely
crime-ridden and impoverished Pico-Union district.
The square-mile area west of downtown is home to 28,000 people, many of them Latin American
immigrants. Police reported a 31 percent reduction in serious crime during September and October,
the first two months the injunction was in force.
"It's an enormous drop," Genelin says. "It's one of the toughest areas of the city. It's right in the heart
of 18th Street, and the 18th Street Gang is our biggest, baddest street gang.
"A gang can't be a gang if it can't associate in public," he says.
Because an injunction is a civil proceeding, defendants do not have a right to a government-paid
lawyer. But the American Civil Liberties Union has challenged the tactic, claiming in part that it unfairly
focuses on minorities.
In addition, says Ramona Ripston, ACLU of Southern California executive director, injunctions don't
work and serve only to placate the public. An ACLU analysis of police statistics for another injunction
issued in 1993 in the San Fernando Valley showed that crime increased just outside the injunction area,
suggesting that gangs merely shifted their activities.
"All it does is move gangs around," Ripston says. "It really doesn't do anything to solve the underlying
problem of gangs."
The Illinois Supreme Court in October also took a dim view of a 1992 Chicago city ordinance that
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allowed police to order that an individual move along if that person is "reasonably believe[d] to be a
criminal street gang member loitering in any public place" with at least one other person.
The state supreme court unanimously called the ordinance vague and arbitrary and thus
unconstitutional. The justices noted that many of the activities the city hoped to deter through the
ordinance already are crimes.
"However, the city cannot empower the police to sweep undesirable persons from the public streets
through vague and arbitrary criminal ordinances," wrote Justice John L. Nickels. City of Chicago v.
Morales 1997 WL 638789.
Deputy Corporation Counsel Larry Rosenthal says the city has received dozens of calls from other
municipalities interested in enacting similar ordinances. He says he expects a broad coalition of
government organizations will support Chicago in asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear the case.
"One of the centerpieces in that petition is going to be how important it is to develop proactive
approaches to dealing with gangs," says Rosenthal. "Removing a visibly lawless element from the street
is very important."

Copyright (C) 1998 by the American Bar Association; John Gibeaut
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SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT
American Criminal Law Review
Winter 1998
Tracey L. Meares

B. Loitering Ordinances
Ordinances that empower police officers to assist residents directly in community guardianship are
another example of law enforcement strategies that have great potential to improve community social
organization. As discussed earlier, work by Professors Sampson and Groves establishes a critical
empirical link between lack of supervision of teen peer groups and both victimization and offending.
This work suggests that strategies designed to augment the ability of adults in the community to
supervise teen peer groups should lead to lower crime levels. Moreover, it should be obvious that such
augmentation may be necessary in neighborhoods in which the parent/child ratio is low, as is the case
in the poorest urban communities. Enforcement of loitering and curfew ordinances is likely to assist
parents in supervising teen peer groups by preventing teens from standing idly on corners (perhaps to
help a friend who is hidden in a dark alley to sell drugs) and by placing limits on a youth's ability to
roam freely at night. Enforcement of such laws also has the potential to improve community social
organization in another way: it redistributes social networks away from the youth in a community in
favor of adults, facilitating the transmission of law-abiding norms from a community's adults to the
children of that community.
Unlike the reverse sting procedure, curfews and loitering laws do not have redistributive qualities that
directly contribute to the perception of poor minorities that the criminal justice scales are being
"righted." Instead, curfews and loitering laws focus on offenders within poor neighborhoods. Some
might view law enforcement strategies that focus on poorly organized communities strategies as
inconsistent with the goals of social organization improvement. However, even appropriately low-level
law enforcement strategies that focus on potential offenders within poorly organized neighborhoods
can improve the structural components of community organization by removing signs of disorder from
the neighborhood and also by clearing the way for community residents to reassert neighborhood
control. And a properly constructed low- level law enforcement strategy should be sensitive to the
racial impact of the law's enforcement either by removing discretion entirely from the officers who
implement them (curfews, for example, apply to all children out of their homes after the designated
hour, regardless of their racial background), or by requiring that discretion be guided in a manner that
assures that police officers are politically accountable to residents in affected communities.
Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance presents a case study of the effects I describe above. In 1992
the Chicago City Council passed an ordinance to restrict gang-related congregations in public ways.
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The ordinance was designed to respond to the grievances of citizens concerned about commonlyoccurring criminal street gang activity in their neighborhoods, such as drive- by shootings, fighting, and
open-air drug dealing. By loitering in alleyway entrances and on street corners, drug dealers both
solicited business and warned hidden compatriots of police patrols. Unlike the loitering ordinances of
yesteryear, Chicago's ordinance placed meaningful constraints on police discretion. Moreover,
community residents played an important part in implementing the ordinances by consulting with law
enforcement officers regarding the specification of gang-loitering "hot spots."
Though Illinois courts have halted enforcement of Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance, the
positive results correlated with its enforcement and the positive potential for social organization related
to the ordinance's structure impel further discussion. Enforcement of the anti-gang loitering ordinance
was correlated with a decrease in city crime in 1993, 1994, and 1995. In all three years, gang-related
homicides, narcotic-related homicides and aggravated batteries decreased. The Eleventh district, which
consistently posts Chicago's highest crime levels, seems to be an anti- gang loitering ordinance success
story. Eleventh district statistics show that while the ordinance was enforced, crime in the district
decreased between eleven and twenty-three percent. And, according to Eleventh district patrol
officers, open-air drug selling, which is not usually captured by official crime statistics, decreased
markedly.
Probably even more important than the effect enforcement of the ordinance had on official crime
statistics was how enforcement of the ordinance affected the behavior of people living in communities
plagued by drug-selling.* * * Open-air drug markets, a common method of drug distribution in
impoverished communities, are obvious eyesores. The residents I spoke to were pleased when the drug
dealing was not out in the open. They felt safer. These reactions are important. Less fearful individuals
are more likely to engage in more public efforts to care for their community's safety, as opposed to
limiting their efforts to private guardianship behavior. Importantly, lowering levels of fear among
neighbors increases the likelihood that individuals will form friendship networks and participate in
social institutions that not only reinforce community-wide guardianship, but also transmit and reinforce
mainstream cultural norms.
Finally, enforcement of the Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance was congenial to social
organization improvement for three additional reasons. First, because it did not depend heavily on
incarceration, enforcement of the anti-gang loitering ordinance was less likely to contribute to the
stigmatization of African Americans than the current prison-dependent drug-law enforcement policy.
Second, the anti-gang loitering ordinance was enforced in every police district of the city of Chicago,
and the racial backgrounds of those arrested were diverse, so an arrest under the ordinance was not
a punishment that could be linked uniquely with African Americans. Third, and perhaps most
important, the anti-gang loitering ordinance garnered widespread support among African Americans
living in neighborhoods with high levels of crime and drug activity. While overwhelming support of
a policy like Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance does not alone justify the law's constitutionality,
widespread support for the policy among African Americans holds an important lesson for policy
makers. When policies respond to the stated needs of community residents, these residents will feel
empowered and efficacious. Residents of empowered communities may be then more likely to work
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together to promote mechanisms for neighborhood self-regulation.

Copyright (C) 1998 by the Georgetown University Law Center; Tracey L. Meares (footnotes
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